Abstract-With the wide use of online social networks (OSNs) , the problem of data privacy has attracted much attention.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) have become an important web service where people can publish and share resources (personal tastes, blogs, or viewpoints) through different types of relationships [1] . A number of social network sites have recently emerged and they are becoming a popular and useful approach in people's daily life. For example, people can make friends with Facebook (http://www.facebook.com) or MySpace (http://www.myspace.com). find job information in Linkedln (http://www.linkedin.com). and so on. The availabil ity of information brings convenience to modern life while significantly raising issues related to personal privacy. For instance, personal private data may be used for promoting unnecessary products, and resources may be abused by some unauthorized users, etc.
It is crucial to effectively protect user privacy in OSN. A significant amount of work for privacy protection on OSN has been introduced [2] - [4] . For example, flyByNight [2] is a Facebook application designed to protect the privacy of messages exchanged between Facebook users. NOY B (short for "None Of Your Business") [5] is another system targeted at cryptographically protecting user privacy on Facebook.
Persona [3] is a private OSN which encrypts user data with attribute-based encryption (ABE), allowing users to apply fine-grained policies over users who may view their data.
Although some new techniques were introduced in these solutions, it is still necessary for a centralized server to enforce access control, which cannot protect the privacy of users against the centralized server. Also, some solutions implemented access control at client-side but their approach should be synchronous, requiring multiple users to be online simultaneously.
One of efficient ways for enforcing access control in OSN is to allow users to put the encrypted data on the server and then only the users who can derive the decryption key would decrypt and access the data. Normally, it can be performed through key management. The advantage of this approach is that a user just simply posts her content but the unauthorized users are not able to obtain the key. Some schemes based on this idea have been proposed [6] - [8] . However, these schemes based on traditional cryptographic techniques have limitations when dealing with multiple groups in OSN since either users must store multiple copies of encrypted data but are unable to give data based on membership in multiple groups, or users must know the identities of everyone to whom they give access.
We believe that a practical and effective key management access control scheme should provide the following properties: I) Autonomy, once a user joins in a private OSN, he chooses his public key and private key by himself and the OSN manager cannot obtain his private key; 2) Independence, a community is constructed by a set of trusted users and there is no third party involved; 3) Collaboration, the kernel members can collaborate to construct and maintain a private OSN so as to reduce the maintenance complexity; 4) Anonymous Authentication, OSN can verify the validity of the user's access permission for a private OSN without a user's identity; and 5) Revocation, a community could revoke the permission of authorized users permanently or temporarily.
A. Our Contributions
To meet the privacy needs of OSN, we present a solution. which fulfills above-mentioned requirements. Our collabora tive framework can provide flexible, efficient privacy protec tions needed in a private OSN without the intervention of a system manager. We briefly summarize the contributions of our work in this paper. To prove the feasibility of our architecture, a proof of-concept prototype of the proposed approach is im plemented by constructing a GCC cryptosystem and an application of community key management method. Ex perimental results show that our construction can achieve the identified design goals for protecting privacy in OSN with the acceptable performance. Table [ summarizes the comparison results between fly ByNight [2] , Persona [3] , and our scheme. We can observe that our approach have following advantages: autonomy, collab oration, anonymous authentication, revocation, and integrity checking. These features could significantly mitigate privacy risks in using OSNs.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the common cryptographic techniques for OSN and how to comprise better cryptosystems in Section [I. We discuss the system architecture of our private OSN in Section III. We introduce the preliminaries of our GCC scheme and present our basic construction for community key management in Section [v. Section V discusses how the proposed approach can be realized in a practical application. We describe the related work in Section VI followed by the conclusion in Section VII.
II. CRY PTOGRAPHY IN OSNs
The main task of cryptography in building a private OSN is to restrict the information available in an appropriate range. 
A. Limitations of Common Encryption Approach
In order to construct A private OSN setting, serval schemes have been proposed in recent years . Although these schemes adopted different cryptographic techniques, such as traditional symmetric/asymmetric encryption [6] , [7] , [9] , [10] , as well as attribute-based encryption (ABE) [3] , [11] , [12] Moreover, a group creators must carefully carry out various maintenance work, such as deleting obsolete information, keeping undesired readers off, and putting hot topics in order, and so on.
B. Our Approach
Our approach, to protect sensitive information in web services from unauthorized access, is to encrypt information using user-controlled keys and to provide access to data using user-controlled delegation. This approach is constructed on a new group-oriented convergence cryptosystem (GCC), which implements encryption and authentication for groups. The most striking feature of this cryptosystem is that this system is organized and managed in a spontaneous way without a system manager. That is, a group of trusted users, not one user, collaborate to manage and maintain a private community. Moreover, this cryptosystem does not need a PKC/PKI system to realize the exchange of group key.
To use GCC, each user in OSN generates the user's private key by himself and registers a public label into the OSN. To create a community, some known users with the same interest (called as the creators of community) generate a community key (CK) in a cooperation way. All of the creators' private keys are valid for this community key. For each friend, a user can then generate an access permission key (APK) corresponding to his own private key and the friend's public label. Using the private key and the community's APK, the user can decrypt (or access) the shared information, but not encrypt (or publish) the information into the community. The encryption operation cannot be implemented unless a user holds the community key.
In order to avoid the adoption of PKC/PKI systems, a temporary public key generated from a user's private key can be used to realize the exchange of encrypted key. In addition, there exists an efficient authentication protocol, by which a untrusted storage service provider (SSP) can check whether or not a user belongs to a certain community.
Furthermore, in our model each user in OSN has only one private key. Each time the user joins in a community, she will be assigned an APK key from her friends, but this APK is invalid for other users. This approach can effectively prevent security problems caused by the loss of access permission key.
III. OUR SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we introduce a private OSN architecture based on a group-oriented convergence cryptosystem. In this architecture, a predominant method of sharing data in OSNs is via collaborative applications.
A. Community and Member Category
Before we describe the framework of our scheme, we first introduce an important concept -community, which is the core notion of our approach. Following the traditional definition of social network, a community is a loose collection of users with the same interest. In our private OSN, a community is organized and managed by collaborative Web applications. By joining a community, one gains the right to create new contents in this community and access others' contents. For instance, the quintessential Facebook application, the Wall, is a peruser forum that features posts and comments from the user and his friends; the Facebook Photos application stores comments and tags for each picture and displays them to friends; and the Flickr photo management and sharing application allows each photograph has a page where members of the Flickr community can comment on photographs.
UTlfl.ll thllri 7.eO u;;ers We introduce a generic model to implement above mentioned collaborative OSN applications. Figure 1 shows a system architecture for our model. In this architecture, a third party is required to be responsible for the web-based applications, as well as the storage of published data. Mean while, it also provides some services for users, such as Web browser service. But we do not demand that this third party is credible for a private OSN. Existing social network sites, such as Facebook, Flickr, and Myspace, even cloud computing platforms are appropriate environments applying our model.
In order to define the range of access control in a private OSN, we classify the users in social networks into four categories:
• Kernel members (KM): can create and manage a special community by collaboration and have rights to publish, delete, access or update resources released by other members of the community;
• Full authorized members (FAM): have full rights to publish and access resources in the community, but do not have permissions to delete or update resources;
• Authorized members (AM): can access the resources by using her own access permission, but cannot publish these resources;
• Unauthorized users (UU): may not have permissions to access resources published by community members.
Note that, it is technically possible using the "delete" and "update" operations to compromise the security of a community, for example, the malicious member can make use of them to manipulate or forge others' opinions. Hence, it is necessary for authorized members to restrict their maintenance operations only for kernel members. Moreover, it is critical to adopt an efficient authentication method to distinguish kernel members from the others.
B. Our Model and Architecture
Our private OSN model could be built in existing social net work platforms, such as Facebook, Orkut, etc, which usually allow developers to create "applications" to extend the types of information that can be stored, manipulated, and shared using social network interfaces. 
Application and Storage Server
In this architecture, the resource publisher enforces access control through encryption and key management on our Gee scheme. Based on the above application dataflow, in Fig. 3 we describe a flowchart for publishing and accessing resources as follows:
• In a social network each user can choose a favorite label and generate a private key by herself, and then register her label into an OSN platform by UserRegister algorithm;
• When somebody wants to share resources with others, she constructs a community together with a set of trusted friends on an OSN platform by BuildCommunity algo rithm. Finally, each member gets a community key, which can be used to access, manage and maintain the resources in this community;
• When a user wishes to access a community, her friends hold the community key can delegate an access per mission key (APK) to her by using DelegatePermission algorithm;
• If one community member wants to post message and resource into the community, she picks the community key, invokes UploadResource algorithm to encrypt the resource with her private key, and then transmits the encrypted data to the storage server; and According to our description, we enforce access control and key management at the client side by a group of kernel members. In our architecture, we do not need to assume that the system manager is trusted to manage a private OSN, so that the community can be constructed in an autonomous and collaborative way, without the involvement of a system manager. To enable access control through key management without a system manager, our design should satisfy several important security and performance requirements, such as autonomy, independence, collaboration, authentication, and revocation.
IV. COMMUNITY KEY MANAGEMENT
In this section, we articulate our scheme for community key management based on above-mentioned architecture. To design this scheme, our work addresses following problems:
how do the kernel members define a community? how do the authorized members generate and distribute the community keys? how do the members grant access permissions corre sponding to a community? how does an untrusted third party (e.g. the OSN platform) can authenticate the kernel members of community? 
Choose private keys in terms of global param eter p and id Generate convergence information 2; from the set of public keys of all kernel members S Build the community key gk with a user's key u.sk and a convergence information 2; Encrypt a resource F by using a user's key u.sk, a member's permission u.pm, and a community key gk Decrypt the ciphertext C by using a user's key u.sk and a member's permission u.pm VeriJY the integrity of the resource F in the ciphertext C Generate the access permission of a commu nity by using a user's key u.sk, a community key gk and a target user's label u' .id Revoke a set of users n from a community by using a user's key u.sk and a community key gk Generate EIGamal public key u.pk from a user's key u.sk and a generator 9 EIGamal encrypt message m to obtain a ci phertext c with a public key u.pk In view of those problems, we propose a community key management scheme as follows: each user in OSN has an unique private key generated by UserRegister algorithm, while guaranteeing that OSN cannot know this key; community man agement mainly relies on three algorithms, Buildcommunity, DelegatePermission and Revocation, to build community and grantlrevoke access permissions without the help of OSN; two algorithms, UploadResource and DownloadResource, are employed for creating, requesting, updating and deleting re sources. In addition, a community maintains and enforces the public community's member list (CML). The kernel members may change the resource CML and revoke specific members to the resources by cryptographic revocation algorithm. Additionally, storage services in our model support two operations for data storage and retrieval: upload and download, which are re realized by encryption and decryption operations on our GCC scheme. In short, the algorithms described in this section are able to allow different members to quickly and flexibly access data and resources in terms of their permissions.
Before we describe our construction, the symbols and notations in our GCC scheme are showed in Table II . Detailed descriptions for these notations and corresponding algorithms are given in Appendix. We will make use of these symbols and notations to elaborate our construction.
A. UserRegister
First of all, the system manager invokes Setup(�) to generate a global parameter p and makes it public. Based on this parameter, any user Ui in OSN may choose a favorite label ui.id and generate his private key Ui.sk by invoking Register( id). Then, the manager registers this label after the user sends it to her. 
B. BuildCommunity
The BuildCommunity function allows a set of trusted users to build a community. In our scheme, a community is built by collaboration of a set of users, rather than defined by one user alone. Furthermore, the community key is obtained by convergence of information of these members, instead of specified by one user or the system manager.
For a set of trusted users S = {Ul,'" ,Um}, anyone in S, called the dealer, can build the community key gk as follows: the dealer chooses a random generator 9 E G for this commu nity, and distributes it to all users in S; each user in S returns a temporary public key ui.pk (as the commitment of his private key) in terms of 9 for i E [1, m]; next, the dealer generates a convergence information � from all temporary public keys {ul.pk,··· ,um.pk}, and then builds the community key gk in terms of CK eyGen(u.sk,�) without the help of manager. The permission delegation is a process to transfer the pennission of a member in the community to her friends.
By DelegatePennission algorithm, the members delegate the "read" right of a community to the external users. In order to avoid a unbounded delegation, we require that only kernel members and full authorized members can employ this algo rithm to delegate access permissions. This algorithm includes two steps: 1) the access permission pm is generated in terms of the user's label; and 2) the access permission pm is securely transmitted from the member to her friends. We make use of EIGamal encryption to build a secure channel. To assign the pennission, the member Ui firstly retrieves the generator g in the community key gk and sends it to her friend Uj. On receiving g, Uj sets up a temporary EIGamal public key in terms of EGSetup(uj.sk,g) and returns the public key to Ui. And then Ui computes the access permission of Uj by his private key, the data received from Uj and the community key gk. Next, Ui encrypts the pennission with Uj'S temporary public key and sends it to Uj. Finally, Uj decrypts the ciphertext with her private key and recovers the access permission.
If the member Ui wishes to delegate the "write" right to her friend, she only needs to transmit the community key besides the pennission pm. That is, Ui merely replaces the line 6 by c +--EGEncrypt( Uj .pk, mj .pmllgk), where II denotes the concatenation operation for two strings.
D. UploadResource
The Upload Resource function is a process that a kernel member or a full authorized member publishes a message for the community. Since the encryption is introduced, the member must hold a valid community key gk to implement this process. Thus, authorized members have no permission to publish messages. In addition, we propose an efficient authentication protocol-F Athenticate(A, B) -to check the identification of members. This process can prevent illegal users to submit invalid ciphertexts to the community.
Suppose the member Ui wants to publish resource F for a special community G. Firstly, the Ui interacts with the social network platform (SNP) to verify whether she is an authorized member. After the Ui passes the authentication protocol, she can encrypt the message and then submit the ciphertext to SNP.
Finally, the SNP uploads the ciphertext to a storage service provider (SSP). Ui: C +--Encrypt ( Ui.sk, Ui.pm, gk, F);
4:
Ui --+ SN P: C;
5:
SNP --+ CSP: upload(C);
The DownloadResource function allows a member to access messages in a private OSN. In order to improve the perfor mance, this function is executed on the cryptographic module of end user. By using the user's private key sk and the access pennission pm for a certain community, any member Ui can decrypt encrypted resources obtained from the social network platform and the storage server according to the algorithm Decrypt ( Ui.sk, Ui.pm, C). Hence, all authorized members in a private OSN can retrieve encrypted data from the storage service provider.
Algorithm 5 AccessResources( Ui, C):
Ui: Message is intact and output F
5: end if
In order to check the integrity of message, the Gee scheme provides an efficient verification algorithm CVerify for the ciphertext by using the cryptographic Hash function. Hence, once the ciphertext has been decrypted, the member can verify whether the decrypted message is intact. If the result of this process is true, then the message can be returned to the Web browser.
F Revocation
The Revocation function allows to exclude a set of members R from all authorized members. To avoid the disclosure of privacy, the revocation is an efficient mechanism to maintain the security of a private OSN during long-tenn running.
With the help of revocation algorithm in the Gee scheme, we can implement the revocation as follows: given a set of revoked members R (obtained from the user's public labe!), the kernel or full authorized member can invoke the Revocation( Ui.sk, gk, R, F) to encrypt the message F by us ing the private key and the community key. Such a revocation does not mean the authorized user will no longer access any resource in the group.
If kernel members wish to revoke permanently an authorized member, she only needs to add this member into the revoked members list (RML) in the community, and then makes this RML public. While uploading the message into the commu nity, it simply requires that the member uses this RML as the set R to encrypt the message.
Note that, in the GCC scheme the number of revoked users is strictly less than the number of kernel users in the group. In order to enhance the capacity of revocation, we can easily increase the number of revoked users by using some random keypair when the community key is generated.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND ApPLICATION
A. Implementation of the Gee scheme An experimental GCC cryptosystem was implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of our scheme. This system was developed with standard C++ language in QT environment, which supports cross-platform deployment. This system con sists of three modules: Cryptographic Module, Private Social Network Platform, and Browser Software. In the cryptographic module, we adopted GNU multiple precision arithmetic library (GMP) to handle integers of arbitrary precision. Then, a finite field arithmetic library was constructed to realize the run-time environment of elliptic curve and pairing-based cryptosystems (in terms of PBC liberty from Stanford University). In addi tion, a Group-Oriented Convergence Cryptosystem library was developed based on the finite field arithmetic library to realize various GCC algorithms. Finally, the GCC algorithms worked with a lightweight private social network platform to provide encryption, authentication and key-label management services for Web browsers.
B. Application for a Blog management
We build a Blog management system where users are able to control access to her data without a third-party. This system supports the editing and publishing of blog posts, comments, and images. Posted data in this system are divided into two categories: public data that is visible to all users; and protected data that is visible only to the members of community that defined by the user. All Blog contents are stored at a server. The architecture of our application is represented in Fig. 4 . 
Server
Once a user is about to post new data to her blog, she first decides which data is public and which data should be protected. For the protected data, she decides which members of community may have access to her data, then encrypts this data with her keys and corresponding community key. Public data together with encrypted data are sent to the server. When somebody in the system browse user A's blog, she gets data from the server. The public data is directly displayed to her, while the protected data is displayed with a default page which means this data is meaningless to the visitor. To view the entire content, she first has to examine the header of ciphertext to check whether she has permissions to access the community.
[f she is an authorized user, she can decrypt the ciphertext and view all contents; Otherwise, the protected data are still unknown to her. Fig. 5 shows an example of our implementation. [n this example, when a user downloads a HTML page from a private OSN, she can only see the public data and some gray frames which denote encrypted data (see Fig. 5 (a) ). Note that, there exists an ActiveX control on the top of two sub-figures, which implements the functions of cryptographic module in Fig. 3 .
[n order to display the encrypted data, the user must click the button on this ActiveX control and then input the user's private key and access permission for this community. If the key and the permission are valid for this community, the ActiveX control would decrypt the encrypted data and display them to the user. The result is showed in Fig. 5 (b) .
VI. RELATED WORKS
There has been a substantial amount of work addressing the problem of privacy protection in social networks. One area of research is to protect user's privacy by enforcing access control. For example, Carminati et al. [11] proposed an rule based access control model which allowed users to specify access rules for their contents. An access rule consists of the resource identifier and a set of conditions which must be satisfied to be allowed to access the resource. A requestor is authorized to access an resource only if he provides the resource owner with a proof that she satisfies at least one of the corresponding access rules, by means of relationship certificates. This scheme enforces access control at client side.
[n addition, they proposed a mechanism to enforce access control for web-based social networks [ [3] .
Besides protection of resources, some recent works address the privacy of relationships in social networks, since avail ability of information on relationships (trust level, relationship type) gives rise to security concerns: knowing who is trusted by a user and to what extent being trusted disclose a lot about user's thoughts and feelings. For example, Carminati et al. [4] described an access control model on relationship protection. [n this model, the relationship certificates are encrypted using symmetric cryptographic algorithm and are treated as a re source: a certificate is granted only one satisfies a distribution rule, which is analogous to the access rule. Ferrer et al. [7] introduced a public-key protocol for private relationships, where certificates were encrypted asymmertrically and signed. But this scheme has drawbacks: relationship strengths are revealed to intermediate users and it requires multiple users !ttj.tQ 2 J"" l tl;-:-M ---" -;: : lll:-" -::
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